

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN *KALĀM* AND LOGIC IN *SAYYID SHARĪF AL-JURJĀNĪ* AND THE USE OF *QIYĀS* (SYLLOGISM) AS A METHOD OF INFERENCE

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Abstract: The study aims to analyze the forms of reasoning in Islamic sciences through *Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī* understands of knowledge and the method of *qiyās* (syllogism). The central problem of the research is how *al-Jurjānī* establishes the epistemological connection between the traditions of logic and *Kalām* (Islamic Theology). This study examines *al-Jurjānī*'s classification of knowledge through the distinction between *taṣawwur* (conception) and *taṣdīq* (assent) and evaluates the functional role he attributes to *qiyās* in the process of progressing from the known to the unknown. Comparisons with figures such as *Aristotle*, *al-Fārābī*, and *Ibn Sīnā* reveal how *al-Jurjānī* integrates formal logical principles with the search for certain knowledge (*yaqīn*) to meet the specific needs of *Kalām*. The study emphasizes that *qiyās* is not only a theoretical tool but also a methodological basis used to ground metaphysical issues such as the existence of God and the origin of the universe. Therefore, the study examines and presents the reasoning model developed by *al-Jurjānī* by re-functionalizing the classical logical heritage within the Islamic intellectual tradition.

Keywords: Logic, *al-Jurjānī*, *Qiyās*, *Nazar*, Theory of knowledge.

INTRODUCTION

Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī occupies a central position in the post-classical Islamic intellectual tradition, particularly at the intersection of logic and *Kalām* (Islamic theology). His works have often been interpreted as a synthesis of earlier philosophical and theological traditions, particularly Aristotelian logic and Ibn Sīnā's epistemology. However, such readings tend to remain largely descriptive, presenting *al-Jurjānī* as a transmitter or systematiser rather than as a thinker advancing a distinct methodological position.

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The study departs from such approaches by formulating a more precise and analytically oriented research problem: what makes an inference epistemically legitimate within *Kalām*, and on what grounds does *al-Jurjānī* distinguish between strong and weak forms of reasoning? This study focuses on shifting the focus from classification to evaluation, arguing that *al-Jurjānī* developed a normative theory of inference where the validity of syllogisms depends not only on their formal structure but also on the epistemic status of their premises and the provability of their inferential connections.

In this respect, *al-Jurjānī*'s thought cannot be adequately understood as a mere continuation of classical logic. On the contrary, it reflects a transformation of logical tools in response to the epistemological and theological demands of *Kalām*. Therefore, its interaction with concepts such as *taṣawwur* (conception), *taṣdīq* (assent), and *nazar* (discursive reasoning leading to knowledge) should be interpreted within a broader framework in which logic serves not only as a tool for thought but also as a means of securing epistemic legitimacy.

This study aims to highlight the problem of inferential legitimacy, demonstrating that *al-Jurjānī*'s contribution lies not only in redefining *qiyās*, but also in revealing the conditions under which reasoning produces knowledge. Before delving into the debates discussed in the study, it would be helpful to briefly provide information about *al-Jurjānī*'s identity and the nature of his views.

Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī, born on February 24, 1340 (Sha'bān 24, 740 AH) in Takū, near Jurjān, took lessons from leading scholars of the time, including *Quṭbuddīn Rāzī*, *Mubārakshāh al-Manṭiqī*, *Akmaladdīn al-Bābartī*, *Sheikh Bedreddin*, the poet *Aḥmedī*, and *Ḥāccī Iwāz Pasha*. *Al-Jurjānī* continued his teaching activities at the *Dār al-Shifā* madrasa for about 10 years and subsequently pursued these activities in *Samarqand* for 18 years. He spent the remainder of his life in *Shiraz* and authored many important works. Some of these works include *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, *Hāshiya 'alā Hidāyat al-Ḥikma*, *Hāshiya 'alā Sharḥ Hikmat al-'Ayn*, *Hāshiya 'alā al-Muṭawwal*, *Hāshiya 'alā Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā*, *Hāshiya 'alā Lawāmi' al-Asrār fī Sharḥ Maṭāli' al-Anwār*, *Hāshiya 'alā Tahrīr Qawā'id al-Manṭiqiyya*, and *Ta'rīfāt* (Gümüş, 1993, 134-136). The content of these works covers fundamental fields such as linguistics, logic, principles of Islamic jurisprudence (*Uṣūl al-Fiqh*), *Kalām*, and philosophy, and they possess a volume that made them foundational sources for subsequent periods. It can be frequently observed in *al-Jurjānī*'s works that logical inference is utilized as a method in *Kalām* issues.

Discussions within the *Kalām* tradition on the methodological foundations of attaining knowledge gained a new dimension, especially with the increasing use of the discipline of logic in Islamic sciences. These discussions were shaped not only on an epistemological level but also on a methodological and ontological one, and were deepened through concepts such as *nazar*, *taṣawwur*, *taṣdīq* and *qiyās*. In this context, *Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī*'s work, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* (Commentary on al-

Ījī's *al-Mawāqif*, stands out as a theoretical source for understanding the methodological relationship between logic and *Kalām*. *Al-Jurjānī*'s understanding of knowledge and, the function he assigns to the theory of *qiyās*, are central to his system of thought, playing a decisive role both in his relationship with the classical logic tradition and in his approach to problems unique to Islamic thought. The study aims to analyze *al-Jurjānī*'s understanding of *qiyās* and its epistemological context, thereby revealing his original contributions to the method of attaining knowledge.

The main subject of the study is to determine the nature and application areas of the forms of reasoning found in *al-Jurjānī*'s works, especially in *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, which he wrote as a commentary on 'Aḍududīn al-Ījī's *al-Mawāqif*, and in his other works on logic, particularly his understanding of *qiyās*. The research question of the study is to identify (if any) the distinctive points of *al-Jurjānī*'s perspective within the problem of knowledge, one of the research areas of logic, from a methodological perspective, and to determine the position of the method he applied within the Islamic intellectual tradition. Moving from this point, an evaluation of *Jurjānī*'s understanding of knowledge should be made.

AL-JURJĀNĪ'S UNDERSTANDING OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE EPISTEMIC ROLE OF 'NAẒAR'

Al-Jurjānī's theory of knowledge is commonly presented through the distinction between *taṣawwur* and *taṣdīq* (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 1/20). At first glance, this distinction appears to follow the well-established framework of classical logic, particularly as developed in the *Avicennian* tradition. However, when examined within the broader context of *al-Jurjānī*'s thought, it becomes clear that this distinction performs a more fundamental role than mere classification.

In the study, this distinction is reinterpreted as the epistemic foundation of inferential evaluation. That is, the division between *taṣawwur* and *taṣdīq* does not simply categorize types of knowledge but determines the conditions under which reasoning can yield certainty.

While *taṣawwur* concerns the formation of concepts without judgment, *taṣdīq* involves the affirmation or denial of a relation between concepts. This difference is crucial, because only *taṣdīq* can function as the outcome of reasoning and thus as the bearer of epistemic value (Osman, 2018, 360).

Accordingly, the central question is not merely how knowledge is divided, but which forms of *taṣdīq* are epistemically legitimate. This shift from classification to evaluation is essential for understanding why *qiyās* occupies a privileged position within *al-Jurjānī*'s system.

Al-Jurjānī further develops this framework by distinguishing between *badīhī* (self-evident) and *naẓarī* (discursive/theoretical) knowledge (al-Jurjānī et al., 2024, 39). Self-evident knowledge is immediate and does not depend on reasoning, whereas theoretical knowledge is acquired through inferential processes.

This distinction introduces an implicit epistemic hierarchy: only those forms of knowledge grounded in secure and reliable premises can serve as the basis for valid inference. Thus, the transition from *badīhī* to *nazarī* knowledge is not merely a process of acquisition but a transformation governed by epistemic constraints.

At this point, the concept of *nazar* becomes central. *Al-Jurjānī* defines *nazar* as the arrangement of known elements in such a way that leads to the acquisition of new knowledge. Traditionally, this definition has been read as describing a cognitive activity or intellectual effort.

However, the study argues that *nazar* should be understood more precisely as a regulated epistemic procedure. It is not simply an act of thinking, but a structured process governed by norms concerning the selection, ordering, and reliability of premises. This reinterpretation has important consequences. If *nazar* is a norm-governed process, then not all instances of reasoning are equally valid. Rather, the legitimacy of *nazar* depends on whether it satisfies certain epistemic conditions. In this sense, *nazar* functions as a bridge between epistemology and logic: it determines not only how knowledge is acquired, but also whether a particular inference of this kind can produce certainty.

Al-Jurjānī's emphasis on the conditions of the knowing subject further reinforces this interpretation. He specifies that the person engaging in *nazar* must be free from cognitive obstacles, such as prejudice or incapacity (*al-Jurjānī*, 2015, 1/53-55). These conditions should not be read merely as psychological requirements but as epistemic safeguards. They ensure that the inferential process is not distorted by factors that undermine the reliability of reasoning.

At the same time, *al-Jurjānī*'s discussion of the intellect (*'aql*) situates reasoning within a broader ontological framework. The intellect is described in multiple ways -as a substance, as a light, or as a cognitive faculty- but in each case, it is closely tied to the process of acquiring knowledge.

What is important here is not that the mind operates merely arbitrarily, but rather that it functions within a structured epistemic system in which knowledge, reasoning, and method are interconnected. This further supports the view that *nazar* is not merely an individual act but part of a normative framework governing inference. Finally, *al-Jurjānī*'s insistence that theoretical knowledge ultimately depends on self-evident knowledge highlights the importance of epistemic grounding.

From the perspective developed in the study, this connection can be understood as the basis for evaluating the strength of inference: a *qiyās* is epistemically legitimate only if its premises are grounded in forms of knowledge that are themselves secure. This point prepares the ground for the central argument of the study. If the value of knowledge depends on its epistemic foundation, then the value of *qiyās* must be assessed in terms of the same criteria. Thus, the transition from epistemology to logic is not a shift in subject matter, but a continuation of the same problem: how to distinguish between inferences that yield

certainty and those that fail to do so.

Defining knowledge as a quality that encompasses all states of knowing, *al-Jurjānī* expresses that knowledge is a structure that enables the person who possesses it to express an opinion about the existence, non-existence, possibility, and impossibility of the subject matter of that knowledge (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 1/20-21). *Al-Jurjānī* divides knowledge into two categories by identifying the concept that does not contain a judgment as *taṣawwur* and the judgment itself as *taṣdīq*. Both *taṣawwur* and *taṣdīq* are further classified into a dual category -*nazarī* and *badīhī*- depending on whether reasoning is required to attain them (al-Jurjānī et al., 2024, 39). While *nazarī* knowledge depends on *kasb* (acquisition) and *nazar*, *badīhī* knowledge cannot be acquired through these means. For example, according to *al-Jurjānī*, one aspect of wisdom corresponds to the acquisition of *nazarī* knowledge, in that it is “a science that investigates the realities of things as they exist, to the extent of human capacity” (al-Jurjānī, 2014/1, 64). In its other aspect, *al-Jurjānī* accepts wisdom as the middle state of the intellectual power, situated between *sawk-i ilāhī* (divine prompting), which is the peak of this power, and stupidity, which is the deficiency of this power. In *badīhī* knowledge, which remains outside of *nazar* and *kasb*, no reasoning or demonstration is required (al-Jurjānī, 2014/2).

According to *al-Jurjānī*, necessary knowledge forms the basis of *nazarī* knowledge, and the aim is to make the unknown knowable through the medium of necessary knowledge. The knowledge obtained because of this process is called *nazarī* knowledge. At this point, *al-Jurjānī*'s understanding of knowledge must be distinguished from the views of *Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī* (al-Rāzī, 2000, 95). This is because *al-Rāzī*, focusing on the concepts of the knower, knowing, and the known, includes the three *taṣawwurāt* upon which *taṣdīq* rests -*maḥkūm 'alayh* (subject of predication), *maḥkūm bihi* (predicate), and *ḥukmī nisbah* (judgmental relation)- into it (al-Jurjānī et al., 2024, 39-40). Thus, he evaluates them in the category of necessary knowledge and claims that they are not obtained through any reasoning (al-Rāzī, 1990, I/435-501). From this perspective, the knowledge in question is more suitable to be considered in the category of *badīhī* knowledge compared to *nazarī* knowledge. *Al-Jurjānī*, however, argues that even the knowledge pertaining to one's own essence becomes known through *nazar*. *Al-Jurjānī* defines *nazar* as the arrangement of certain or probable knowledge in a way that enables the acquisition of further knowledge (al-Jurjānī et al., 2024, 36-40).

The concept of certainty plays a central role in this framework. However, certainty it is not a univocal notion. To clarify *al-Jurjānī*'s position, it is necessary to distinguish between at least three types of certainty

- (1) *Logical necessity*: the conclusion follows from the premises by virtue of formal structure.
- (2) *Epistemic justification*: the premises themselves are grounded in reliable and necessary knowledge.

(3) *Theological grounding*: the ultimate guarantee of knowledge is linked to divine causation.

This distinction is crucial because it explains why a formally valid *qiyās* may still be epistemically weak: logical necessity without epistemic justification does not yield genuine certainty. Thus, the evaluation of *qiyās* must operate across multiple levels, not merely at the level of form. At this point, it should be noted that the knowledge that makes the unknown knowable is not random. This information can be used to make choices that are valid and consistent in reasoning.

Here, it is the *'aql* that determines both the selection process and the order of the elements-the known, the desired-to-be-known, and the elements ensuring the similarity between them. Accordingly, the predicate (*maḥkūm bihi*), that is, the element with which the judgment is made, and the act of judging are *naẓarī*. Thus, *naẓar* is not merely the comprehension of its relation to the issue it is connected with.

After explaining the nature of *naẓar* in his works, *al-Jurjānī* also addresses the conditions required of the person engaging in *naẓar*. According to him, this person must be alive and rational, must not have conditions that prevent comprehension, and must not have prejudices that would necessitate the rejection of *naẓar* (*al-Jurjānī*, 2015, 1/55). *Al-Jurjānī* characterizes the *'aql* as a substance that is uncompounded from matter in its essence but compounded with matter in its act, emphasizing that it is identical with the *naḥs-i nāṭiqā* (rational soul). Accordingly, the nature of the intellect can be explained by five different views. First, the intellect can be a spiritual substance created by God in connection with the human body. Second, the intellect can be described as a light in the heart that mediates the distinction between truth and falsehood. Third, the intellect is a structure that allows for control over the human body as a substance uncompounded from matter, like *al-Jurjānī*'s general characterization of the intellect. Fourth, the intellect is limited as a faculty of the rational soul and is characterized only as a means. Finally, the intellect is described by highlighting its cognitive quality, based on the acceptance that the intellect, the soul (*naḥs*), and the mind are the same thing. The position and quality of the intellect, which is directly related to the issue of *naẓar* is connected to these definitions and characterizations, even if not with the same value. This is because the process of acquiring knowledge is only possible by establishing the connection between the intellect, *naẓar* and method (*al-Jurjānī*, 2014/1, 44-45). At this point, in the discussion of *naẓar* which *al-Jurjānī* handles in detail the necessity (*ḍarūra*) of the knowledge obtained because of this method is emphasized. This necessity, as accepted by the *Ash'arī theologians* despite some controversial definitions of knowing, arises not only through the slave's knowledge but because of God's power (*al-Nasafī*, 1993, 1/13; *al-Rāzī*, 2002, 2/185; *al-Baghdādī*, 1928, 15; *al-Āmidī*, 2003, 1/16; Özpilavcı, 2010, 95-97). This situation clearly demonstrates the emphasis on the determining role of divine power in the emergence of knowledge.

In this context, *al-Jurjānī* states that all comprehensions reached through the *‘aql* aim to attain *taṣawwur* and *taṣdīq*, and that *naẓar* can only be conducted with the purpose of achieving one of these two goals (Özturan, 2015, 114). Here, *naẓar* aiming for *taṣawwur* is definition and proposition, while *naẓar* aiming for *taṣdīq* is proof (*dalīl*) and inference (*istidlāl*), i.e., reasoning. Thus, in common with the traditional understanding of logic, *al-Jurjānī* divides definition into *ta’rīf (ta’rīf bi’l-ḥadd*, essential definition) and *rasm (ta’rīf bi’r-rasm*, descriptive definition) based on whether it includes essential (*dhātī*) and accidental (*‘arīdī*) qualities and explains the topic with examples. Following these explanations, *al-Jurjānī* provides commentary on *taṣdīq* (assent) which is the main subject of the study (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 1/68; al-Jurjānī et al., 2024, 56).

According to *al-Jurjānī*’s acceptance, knowledge about the unknown can be acquired through given a priori/*badīhi*/necessary knowledge. This process can only be carried out through an act of reasoning. Deduction, induction, and analogy are the types of reasoning mentioned. Reasoning is called deduction or syllogism (*qiyās*) if it moves from a universal (general) proposition to a particular (specific) conclusion; it is called induction (*istikrā*) if it aims to reach universal knowledge from the particular; and it is called *analogy* if it reaches a conclusion based on the similarity between two particular situations (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 1/70-71). At this point, it is necessary to emphasize the distinction between the *qiyās* used by jurists (*fuqahā’*) and the *qiyās* used by logicians. The *qiyās* of the jurists is rather the method logicians call analogy. This is because they approximate two particulars due to the similarity of their effective cause (*‘illa*) and render the ruling (*ḥukm*) of one valid for the other as well (Ḥasırcı, 2010, 62-63). The reason for this explanation is to eliminate the potential confusion caused by the jurists naming this method *qiyās*.

In addition to distinguishing between logical and *juridical qiyās* (analogical reasoning in Islamic law), the method of inference from the observable to the unobservable (*istidlāl bi-shāhid ‘alā ghā’ib*), particularly used by *Ash‘arī theologians*, is also significant due to its connection with the subject. Although attempts have been made to establish this method as a source for deduction, it is not correct to state that they are identical. This is because deduction focuses entirely on concrete universal knowledge. The inference from the witnessed to the absent method also differs from *juridical qiyās* to a certain extent. The process in *juridical qiyās* of transferring the ruling valid for one to the other, by centering on the similarity between the two particulars, accepts the particulars as the original case entirely. In the *istidlāl bi-shāhid ‘alā ghā’ib* method, however, a universal meaning abstracted from the particulars is taken as the basis (Kömürcü, 2017; Durusoy, 2010, 16). Therefore, it is not correct to state that it is necessarily always either deduction or *juridical qiyās*. *Al-Juwaynī*, who stood out with his criticisms of this method of the theologians, prepared the ground for important discussions on the matter in the later period (Türker, 2007, 24-25). Ultimately, the critical approach

initiated by *al-Juwaynī* had a determining influence on the *Kalām* and logic literature of the later literature of the later period; methodological discussions acquired a character that shaped not only technical but also epistemological orientations.

Thus, this critical approach opened the door to new questions for later thinkers, not only about a methodological quest but also concerning the source, structure, and certainty of knowledge. This search, in many theologians and philosophers, including *al-Jurjānī*, led to the re-evaluation of *qiyās* as an epistemological tool. The mode of thought, starting with *al-Ghazālī*, which advocated the necessity of using logic as a tool for Islamic sciences, also yielded practical results (Hasırcı, 2010, 60). Thus, *qiyās*, which *al-Ghazālī* characterized as the beginning of thought and the end of action, began to be accepted, under the influence of *al-Jurjānī* as well, not only as a logical inference but as a functional method for attaining *nazarī* knowledge—that is, a central tool in determining the criteria of truth and certainty of knowledge (al-Ghazālī, 2023, 41; Altunya, 2013, 62). Within this framework, discussing the epistemic status of *qiyās*, its constituent elements, and its role in *Kalām* issues becomes essential for understanding *al-Jurjānī*'s theory of knowledge.

THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF *QIYĀS* (SYLLOGISM) IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT

In the classical logic tradition, *qiyās* is defined as the fundamental form of inference that makes it possible to reach the unknown based on the known. However, this definition is not limited to merely formal validity; especially in Islamic thought, *qiyās* has been evaluated as a central tool that determines the epistemic status of knowledge. In *al-Jurjānī*'s approach, *qiyās* assumes an epistemological function as one of the most reliable ways to attain necessary knowledge. In his understanding of knowledge, *qiyās* is not only a theoretical inference but also a systematic thinking practice that leads to intellectual certainty.

The claim of certainty in classical logic, which adopts deduction as its fundamental method, is directly based on *Aristotle*'s understanding of essence. According to *Aristotle*, the middle term, which constitutes the structure of the syllogism and makes deduction possible, represents the essence. Because this middle term contains knowledge at the level of certainty, its truth is derived from its own nature (Kneale & Kneale, 1962, 72). The “essence,” which expresses the totality of the necessary attributes of existence, constitutes the direct subject of science in classical logic. This is because, according to the classical logic perspective, scientific knowledge is only possible through the knowledge of what is necessary and universal. The element that carries this kind of knowledge into the process of reasoning is the “middle term,” which is at the heart of the syllogism-

that is, the essence. Therefore, in a deductive reasoning, the initial premise must be based on a principle that is undoubted and known necessarily. The claim of certainty in deduction is precisely because it relies on this a priori and immutable essence. Consequently, the essence is both the fundamental basis that provides certainty of knowledge and the center of the structure of classical logic, which is built upon objective and unchanging principles (Köz, 2002, 359-360). In addition to this, the essence, which is the center of certainty, is also its guarantor. Although *al-Jurjānī* does not express the justification for this certainty based on Aristotle and his understanding of essence, he takes the necessary existence of the universal proposition as his foundation. According to him, the validity of *qiyās* is determined by the agreement between existence and the mind.

Classical logic, although fundamentally adopting a specific method - especially deduction- is essentially an “instrumental science/instruments of knowledge” (*ālāt al-‘ilm*) that presents a body of methods. Thus, in classical logic, while deduction is defined as the most reliable form of *qiyās* leading to certain knowledge, induction and analogy are also accepted as valid forms of reasoning. However, these methods are differentiated in terms of their level of certainty: deduction has a higher epistemic value than induction, and induction has a higher value than analogy. Classical logic sets valid rules for each of these different methods and argues that attaining knowledge is possible if these rules are followed. Furthermore, it verifies the criteria for truth and validity in accordance with the principles it has established. Within this framework, classical logic is positioned as a science of method that systematically organizes three fundamental forms of reasoning and prioritizes one of them -deduction- in particular. These types of reasoning were also addressed by *al-Jurjānī*, and the necessity for preferring deduction, due to its effect on the search for certainty, was expressed (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 1/70-72).

Al-Jurjānī's works include the methods of knowledge and definitions of *nazar* of some theologians such as *al-Bāqillānī*, *al-Āmidī*, and *al-Juwaynī*, and he states that the most fundamental characteristic of *nazar* is to bring about the manifestation of *maṭlūb* (sought conclusion). (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, 1/207; al-Āmidī, 2003, 1/52-60; al-Juwaynī, 1950, 3-5). *Al-Jurjānī* argues that *nazar* has the properties of being true and false, exists as a method for conveying knowledge regarding the object of speculation, and must possess certain conditions, and that the person performing *nazar* must also have certain qualities (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 2/364-366). This is because, according to *al-Jurjānī*, *qiyās* is a series of statements composed of propositions. When these propositions are accepted as true, another conclusion necessarily arises from them by virtue of their nature (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 1/396; al-Jurjānī et al., 2024, 60; Kayacık, 2011, 71). The execution of the correct inference is only possible through a person who knows how to use this method (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 1/54-55).

At this point, it would be appropriate to examine, in a comparative manner,

the descriptions *al-Jurjānī* uses while explaining the elements contained in his definition of *qiyās* with the definitions in the logical tradition. In this context, the philosophers to be discussed in the study are Aristotle, the founder of logic; *al-Kindī*, the first Islamic philosopher; and *al-Fārābī* and *Ibn Sīnā*, who were commentators of *Aristotle* among Islamic philosophers. Although there are occasional differences in the definition, naming, and classification of *qiyās* among Islamic logicians, they generally align with the *Aristotelian* understanding. However, despite this similarity, some subtle differences observed in the definition and usage show that Islamic logicians did not take the concept of *qiyās* directly from *Aristotle* as it was but reinterpreted it within their own intellectual tradition. For instance, *Aristotle*, who defines *qiyās* as a statement composed of certain elements such that, when those elements are accepted, a different conclusion necessarily follows from them by virtue of their own structure, also evaluates *istikrā* as a type of syllogism within this definition and includes the method of induction under the name “inductive syllogism” (*al-qiyās al-istikrāʿī*) within the syllogistic system (Aristotle, 1989, 5; Aristotle, 2011, 24b, 66). This approach reflects *Aristotle*’s tendency to ground all forms of reasoning within the logic of *qiyās*.

Aristotle subjects’ syllogisms to a dual classification structurally as “perfect” and “imperfect.” According to him, if the conclusion of a syllogism is clearly and directly contained within the premises, this type of syllogism is called a “perfect syllogism.” In contrast, if the conclusion is not explicitly stated in the premises but is obtained through the relation between the terms, the syllogism in question is an “imperfect syllogism.” This distinction shows that Aristotle associated the logical power of the syllogism with the level of clarity carried by the premises (Aristotle, 1989, 6; Aristotle, 2011, 24b, 67). The definitions of *qiyās* by *Aristotle* and *al-Jurjānī* are quite similar.

Al-Jurjānī, stating that *qiyās* carries a value of certainty and has forms, has also generally characterized weak syllogisms, in the context of *al-Ījī*’s views (al-Ījī, 1997, 181-182) -who defined *qiyās* as ‘a discourse composed of propositions such that whenever those propositions are accepted, another statement necessarily follows from that discourse by virtue of its essence’- in a manner similar to *Aristotle*’s theory of syllogism. *Al-Jurjānī* accepts the methods used by theologians, which lack proof, as weak syllogisms, emphasizing the impossibility of the common *illa* (being visibly present in them and stating that their certainty is problematic (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 2/406). As can be understood from this statement, the *qiyās* that enables the acquisition of a necessarily certain conclusion is deduction only.

The first Islamic philosopher, *al-Kindī*, whose significant works on logic have not survived to the present day. However, it is understood from the surviving treatises that *al-Kindī* translated *Aristotle*’s *Prior Analytics*, which grounds the syllogistic system, into Arabic under the title *al-ʿaks* (conversion/reversal).

This choice reveals that he viewed the core issue of *Prior Analytics* not as the theory of syllogism itself, but as the process of converting premises and reducing syllogisms to the first figure through this method (Rescher, 2011, 226). In the treatise he wrote about the number of *Aristotle's* works, he introduced each book of the *Organon* and defined *qiyās* in a manner like *Aristotle's* approach. According to him, *qiyās* is a series of statements through which a conclusion, not explicitly expressed in them but derived from them and contained within their scope, emerges (Al-Kindī, 2014, 281). While *al-Kindī* does not deviate from *Aristotle* with this view, he specifically states that a conclusion can only be reached within the framework of the given premises in a *qiyās*. In this context, it can be stated that *al-Kindī's* definition of *qiyās* is close to *al-Jurjānī's* views. This is because *al-Jurjānī* also argues that, in addition to the certainty value of the conclusion of *qiyās*, the implicit knowledge contained in the universal premise is revealed. Accordingly, *al-Jurjānī* has also used this method, which he characterized as the determination of the unknown based on the known, in a practical sense in discussions such as the existence of God and the Prophets, and the createdness of the world, found in his work (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 1/ 410).

According to another Islamic philosopher, *al-Fārābī*, *qiyās* is a proof formed by combining specific propositions; when these propositions are logically combined, new knowledge necessarily emerges from them (Al-Fārābī, 1986, 19; Al-Fārābī, 1990a, 92; Al-Fārābī, 1990b, 59). According to him, *qiyās* is divided into five sections: *demonstration (burhān)*, *dialectical qiyās*, *rhetorical qiyās*, *sophistical qiyās*, and *poetical qiyās* (Al-Fārābī, 1990a, 20). At this point, it would not be wrong to say that *al-Fārābī* agrees with *al-Jurjānī* due to his statement that new knowledge is derived from *qiyās*. However, it can be stated that his statement regarding the conclusion in his definition of *qiyās* is not as explicit as *al-Jurjānī's* definition.

Ibn Sīnā, considered the most accomplished commentator on *Aristotle* in the Islamic logical tradition, uses the term "*istidlāl*" in the sense of *qiyās* in his comprehensive logical works. According to him, *istidlāl* is a mental activity aimed at bringing the interlocutor to a specific conclusion or goal, and in this respect, it is an art. Like any art, *istidlāl* gains existence through its own "matter" and "form." Consequently, any deterioration or deficiency in these two elements directly affects the resulting conclusion. *Ibn Sīnā* clarifies this situation with a concrete example, stating that a house built with materials -such as rotten wood and poor-quality clay- will not acquire an aesthetic appearance, no matter how beautifully it is designed. With this *analogy*, he emphasizes the determining role of the soundness and arrangement of the premises used in *qiyās* on the truth of the resulting conclusion (Ibn Sīnā, 1964, 6-7). For *Ibn Sīnā*, the process of reasoning gains functionality in proportion to the human mind's capacity for knowledge. In this context, *qiyās* is not merely a form of discourse from which another judgment is assumed to follow; it is truly a style of intellectual inference from which a judgment is necessarily

obtained through reasoning. That is, *qiyās* is a logical operation that establishes a necessary, not probable, connection and is based on intellectual necessity.

This definition reveals that *qiyās* serves the production of certain knowledge based on specific and consistent principles (Ibn Sīnā, 1985, 69; K m rc , 2010, 175-195; Ibn Sīnā, 2013, 60). In the sense presented by *Ibn Sīnā*, *burh n* results in new knowledge that emerges necessarily through the method used, not through an arbitrary choice among possibilities. In this approach, the conclusion is not a randomly determined judgment among possibilities, but a certain knowledge reached directly by the intellect, in a necessary connection with the premises. *Ibn Sīnā*'s understanding largely overlaps with *al-Jurj n *'s emphasis on the epistemic certainty attributed to *qiyās*. Both thinkers argue that *qiyās* is a method based on the search for necessity, not randomness or probability, in the production of knowledge. This stance supports *al-Jurj n *'s goal of classifying the issue of method and types of knowledge in his classification of *ta awwur-ta d q*. This is because the understanding of the method resulting from the said classification will affect the value of the knowledge to be attained (al-Jurj n , 2005, 36). Accordingly, the method of *ta awwur* is definition (*ta'rif*), and the method of *ta d q* in terms of its relation to reasoning, is proof (*hujja*) ( zturan, 2015, 115-116). Thus, knowledge can be acquired either through definition or through *qiyās*.

According to *Ibn Sīnā*, who has more than one definition of *qiyās*, the syllogism can be characterized in its most general sense as follows: *Qiyās* is a series of statements in which multiple propositions are included, and from these propositions, new knowledge necessarily emerges, due to the relationship between them stemming from their essence and not being merely accidental (Ibn Sīn , 1964, 54). *Ibn Sīn *'s definition of the concept of *qiyās* in his *Kit b al-Naj t*, which he wrote as a summary of some sections of his *qiyās* work, can be summarized as follows: According to him, *qiyās* is a totality of statements formed by the assembly of various propositions. When these propositions are articulated, another judgment, which remains outside of them, is necessitated because the connection between them stems not from an accidental bond, but from their very essence. The phrase "is necessitated" here refers to the emergence of new knowledge through these premises and their logical form, and the presentation of this *ta d q* as the natural result of the syllogism (Ibn Sīn , 1985, 69). Furthermore, *Ibn Sīn * characterizes *qiyās* in his book *Ish r t wa-tanb h t* as follows: According to him, the tools used to prove a judgment that is not directly acceptable as true or is not accepted in practice even if it is possible to accept, are grouped into three categories: The first is *qiyās*, the second is *istikr *' and similar methods, and the third is *analogy* and similar forms of inference (Ibn Sīn , 2005, 57).

In this section, *Ibn Sīn * defines the concept of *qiyās* more clearly by explicitly distinguishing it from *istikr *' and *analogy*. The definition he presents in this context emphasizes the structure of *qiyās* that distinguishes it from other types of reasoning, presenting it as a distinct form of thought with the capacity to produce necessary knowledge. This is because, according to *Ibn Sīn *, *qiyās* is a

fundamental method and a totality of statements formed by the combination of multiple propositions. When the truth of the propositions within the *qiyās* is accepted, new knowledge necessarily emerges from them due to their own logical order (Ibn Sīnā, 2005, 58; Ibn Sīnā, 1953, 3; Ibn Sīnā, 2013, 29).

Although he has more than one definition of *qiyās*, the *qiyās* definitions provided above from *Ibn Sīnā* contain almost the same meanings. In this context, the overlap between *Ibn Sīnā*'s and *al-Jurjānī*'s definitions of *qiyās*, as well as their classification of reasoning into *deduction*, *induction*, and *analogy*, and their argument that deduction (i.e., *qiyās*) is the most valuable and the method for obtaining the most certain knowledge, show that they both accept the same syllogistic system (Ece, 2014, 172-173).

When addressing the elements of *qiyās*, *al-Jurjānī* primarily focuses on the types of premises in terms of their potential to yield knowledge and the figures of the syllogism (al-Jurjānī et al., 2024, 42-43). According to him, premises are divided into seven types based on the certainty value they contain: a priori and those close to it, observational (*mushāhadāt*), experimental (*tajrībī*), intuitive (*ḥadsiyyāt*), traditionally transmitted (*mutawātirāt*), and illusory (*wahmī*) ones. These are the qualities of premises used in certain (*qaṭ'ī*) propositions. Probable (*ẓannī*) propositions, on the other hand, are divided into four: granted (*musallam*), widely accepted, well-known (*mashhūr*), accepted/admitted proposition (*maqbul*), and those resulting from apparent indications (*qarīnah*) (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 1/428). Although there are some differences, this classification is also found in *al-Fārābī* and *Ibn Sīnā* (Al-Fārābī, 2012, 3; Ibn Sīnā, 2005, 50-51). *Al-Jurjānī* divides proofs into three types: rational, transmitted, and those that are a combination of both. Although he expresses the rational ones as purely rational not based on transmission, the transmitted ones as purely transmitted but logically either true or false, and the others as a combination, he ultimately refers to the latter two as *naqlī* ones due to the dominance of transmitted elements and the problematics of discussing them on a rational ground (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 2/436; İnce, 2023, 278-279).

It was previously stated that the main element of *qiyās*, according to *al-Jurjānī*, is self-evident necessary knowledge. Although there is no disagreement regarding this, there are some discussions on whether necessary knowledge depends on discursive/theoretical knowledge. From this perspective, it can be argued that necessary self-evident knowledge does not require reliance on any other data. Some *Ash'arī theologians* state that this is possible. However, in addition to the reason mentioned above, *al-Jurjānī* argues that it is impossible for necessary knowledge to rely on *nazarī* knowledge because the continuous need of the necessary for another necessary would necessitate an infinite regress (*tasalsul*). Furthermore, *al-Jurjānī* maintains that the entire discussion here is purely syntactical (*lafẓī*) and that the problem can be resolved by clarifying the said term (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 2/ 446-448).

Another problem concerning *qiyās* that *al-Jurjānī* addresses is the possibility

of the existence of knowledge whose object is unknown. In contrast to *al-Jubbā'ī*'s defense that the existence of such knowledge is possible, *al-Rāzī* considers this to be a contradictory stance. While *al-Jubbā'ī* argues that not all knowledge about the impossible originates from a known object, *al-Rāzī* states that the known belongs to knowledge, and even impossibility originates from the known possibility (Koloğlu, 2017; al-Rāzī, 2000, 98-99). *Al-Jurjānī* attempts to explain *al-Jubbā'ī*'s stance through Ibn Sīnā's statement that the impossible has no form in the mind, yet he states that even in things without form, one can characterize them through their opposite or negative. That is, what does not have existence cannot be conceived by its essence, but can be interpreted based on analogy (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 2/450-452).

In the discussion of *qiyās*, which *al-Jurjānī* claims to be controversial, there are three different views on whether *naẓarī* knowledge is necessary. The first view suggests that such a characterization is possible. According to this view, *Sufī* paths to knowledge such as *kashf* (unveiling), *ilhām* (inspiration), and intuition cannot be accepted as sources of knowledge. In this regard, it may not always be correct to speak of a difference in rank among types of knowledge. This is because they are common in terms of being knowledge as a genus (al-Bāqillānī, 1957, 10-21). Therefore, if it is possible to acquire knowledge theoretically, it is also possible for *naẓarī* knowledge to be necessary. According to the second view, *naẓarī* knowledge cannot transform into necessary knowledge. This is because the knowledge to be obtained during *naẓar* is unknown and claiming that an unknown is necessary is contradictory. According to the third view, there is no change in the necessary knowledge where the condition of intellectual perfection is present (al-Juwaynī, 1978, 140-144).

Al-Jurjānī's own view is that necessary knowledge is knowledge obtained directly, without the need for proof or speculation. Discursive/theoretical knowledge is defined as knowledge that requires proof, reasoning and effort (being *kasbī/acquired*). In this respect, they are two things of different natures and do not completely transform into one another. However, *naẓarī* knowledge also expresses certainty. When *naẓarī* knowledge is proven with very strong and solid proofs, it becomes free of doubt and gains certainty (Marulcu, 2018, 35-36). Nevertheless, no matter how certain *naẓarī* knowledge is, transformation is impossible because its mode of acquisition (*sabab al-ḥuṣūl*) always remains reasoning-based. Necessary knowledge, on the other hand, is always that which is without reasoning (al-Jurjānī, 2015, 2/442-444).

As can be understood from the information provided and the discussions relayed, *al-Jurjānī* focused on issues concerning the nature of reasoning, specifically *qiyās*, in terms of its applicability, rather than dealing with it as a formal method, as in classical logic. This is because he investigates the extent to which *qiyās* can help seek answers to problems within the *Kalām* tradition, without aiming to regulate or criticize its formal structure. It is evident, especially in the discussions regarding the nature of knowledge within the text, that *al-Jurjānī* did

not merely describe *qiyās* and other forms of reasoning; on the contrary, he actively used them to strengthen his own argument. This form of inference, which he states will enable the determination of the unknown based on the known, is also the method that carries a claim of certainty and has the highest epistemic value. Therefore, it is meaningful to use this method to make the strongest inference regarding core issues of religion, such as the world, God, and prophecy, and the main topics of these discussions, such as knowledge and existence. For these reasons, *al-Jurjānī* emphasized the possibility of reasoning by applying the subject of reasoning, which he addressed in a highly detailed and applicable sense, in a practical manner.

CONCLUSION

Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī's work, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, is notable not only in the fields of *Kalām* and logic but also for its philosophical depth and systematic structure within the Islamic intellectual tradition. In this study, *al-Jurjānī's* approach, put forth in the context of his understanding of knowledge, forms of reasoning, and especially his theory of *qiyās*, has been addressed; the relationship he established with the classical logic tradition has been evaluated at both the conceptual and methodological levels. Ultimately, the epistemological and theoretical value *al-Jurjānī* attributes to *qiyās* within his logical thought is central to his philosophy of knowledge and constitutes the basis of the bridge he built between classical logic and *Kalām* issues.

Al-Jurjānī's theory of knowledge is based on two fundamental elements: *taṣawwur* and *taṣdīq*. This distinction has been elaborated in detail by many philosophers in the history of Islamic logic, especially by *Ibn Sīnā*. *Al-Jurjānī* not only preserved this classical differentiation but also provided an original contribution to this structure with his distinction between necessary and theoretical knowledge. In particular, the meaning he attributed to the concept of *nazar* led him to position it not merely as mental attention or orientation, but as a necessary methodological activity in the process of attaining knowledge. According to *al-Jurjānī*, *nazar* is the primary tool for reaching the unknown from the known, and the functioning of this tool is defined through *qiyās*. For this reason, in his epistemological system, *qiyās* functions not as a mere logical form, but as a necessary path to directly attain knowledge.

Qiyās, in *al-Jurjānī's* system of thought, is not just a theoretical inference mechanism; it is also used as a practical epistemological tool in solving *Kalām* and metaphysical problems. *Al-Jurjānī's* recourse to the method of *qiyās* in the rational grounding of fundamental matters of faith such as the existence of God, prophecy, and the createdness of the world, is an indication of the functional quality he assigns to reasoning. At this point, a crucial aspect that formally distinguishes *al-Jurjānī's* understanding of *qiyās* from both Aristotle and the Islamic philosophers

is his evaluation of *qiyās* primarily in terms of epistemic certainty, not just logical validity. That is, *qiyās* is fundamentally not just a structure from which the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, but also a functional process through which necessary knowledge is produced.

According to *al-Jurjānī*, the epistemic value of *qiyās* is directly related to the nature of the premises it contains. In this context, his categorization of the premises used in *qiyās* -such as a priori, observational, experimental, intuitive, traditionally transmitted, and illusory demonstrates how epistemic values are reconciled with the syllogistic structure. The distinction between certain and probable premises indicates not only an epistemological but also a methodological differentiation. This is because *al-Jurjānī* seeks to determine, through this distinction, which types of syllogisms can lead to certain knowledge. In this sense, his understanding of *qiyās*, while encompassing the formal rules of classical logic, can also be seen as an evaluation criterion regarding the content of knowledge production.

Aristotle's understanding of *qiyās* presents a deductive system structured around the concept of essence. *Al-Jurjānī* reinterpreted this structure within Islamic philosophy, making it applicable to *Kalām* issues. The prioritization of the deductive method in terms of epistemic certainty shows his influence from both Aristotle and *Ibn Sīnā*. However, what is noteworthy here is *al-Jurjānī*'s adoption of this method not merely with a claim of theoretical validity, but as a method usable in religious-text-centered problems. In this respect, his understanding of logic transcends being a mere "instrumental science" and becomes a form of thought that plays a direct role in solving theological and philosophical issues.

Al-Jurjānī also clearly lays out the distinction between the use of *qiyās* in *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* and its use in logic, stating that *jural qiyās* mostly corresponds to analogy in the logical sense. This distinction shows that *al-Jurjānī* evaluated *qiyās* not only in the context of *Kalām* and philosophy but also in the context of Islamic jural thought. His classification of forms of inference, including the distinction between *istidlāl bi-shāhid 'alā ghā'ib*, *jural qiyās*, and classical deduction, indicates the comprehensive scope of his logic theory and *al-Jurjānī*'s meticulousness in examining these areas.

When compared to Aristotle, *al-Kindī*, *al-Fārābī*, and *Ibn Sīnā*, *al-Jurjānī*'s definition of *qiyās* contains unique emphases even where it overlaps. *Al-Jurjānī*'s relating the conclusion of *qiyās* not only to logical necessity but also to epistemic value, with a focus on functionality, reveals that he based his understanding of *qiyās* on its practical correspondence in life, transcending classical formal logic. This means that *qiyās* is seen as an essential, not merely instrumental, element in the production of knowledge. According to him, *qiyās* is not just a mental activity, but also the manifestation of an agreement established between existence and the mind. This agreement is ensured by the premises' correspondence to reality and their logical order.

In conclusion, *al-Jurjānī*'s understanding of *qiyās*, while adopting the formal

structure of classical logic, transformed and functionalized this structure within the context of Islamic philosophy and *Kalām*. In his thought, *qiyās* is positioned not merely as a theoretical form of inference, but as the most reliable method for knowledge production, possessing the highest degree of certainty. For this reason, *al-Jurjānī* grounded *qiyās* on both methodological and ontological levels, thereby establishing a link between classical logic and the Islamic intellectual tradition. The analysis and comparisons made in the study show that this link deepens not only on the formal level but also on the level of meaning and function. Thus, *al-Jurjānī*'s thought elevated *qiyās* from being a tool of thought to the necessary structure for attaining knowledge.

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