

CATEGORIAL RELATIONS AS TRUTH-MAKERS IN FRANZ BRENTANO'S DISSERTATION

by Ion TĂNĂSESCU (Bucharest)

Nowadays, Franz Brentano is acknowledged both by phenomenologists as well as analytical philosophers as an author who made an important contribution to criticizing the Aristotelian correspondence theory of truth. This reputation is mainly based on his lecture entitled 'On the Concept of Truth'¹ which he delivered to the Vienna Philosophical Society on the 27th of March 1889. The text is referenced in both Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (1927)² and in recent discussions on the correspondence theory of truth.³ From my point of view, this way of

Dr. Ion TĂNĂSESCU (1964) is senior researcher at the Romanian Society for Phenomenology and at the Institute of Philosophy of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, where he is the head of the Department of the History of Ideas. Recently, he edited and published a contribution in *Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology*, Bucharest, Zeta Books, 2012 and in *Franz Brentano et la philosophie* (special issue of *Revue roumaine de philosophie* 1-2 (2011)).

¹ This paper was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research, CNCS-UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0661.

F. BRENTANO, 'On the Concept of Truth', in: ID., *The True and the Evident*. German edition by O. KRAUS 1930. English edition by R.M. CHISHOLM. Trans. by R.M. CHISHOLM, E. POLITZER and K.R. FISCHER, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 2-17.

² M. HEIDEGGER, *Sein und Zeit*. Dreizehnte, unveränderte Auflage, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1976, p. 215; see also, F. BRENTANO, 'On the Concept', pp. 7-8.

³ W. KÜNNE, *Conceptions of Truth*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2003, p. 110. The Brentanian criticism of the Aristotelian correspondence theory of truth starts from the observation that there are many statements whose truth cannot be established on the basis of correspondence with reality since the object to which they refer is not real, e.g. the sentences concerning objects of thought (*Gedankendinge*) like centaurs or dragons or sentences on past or future events, etc. (F. BRENTANO, *The True*, p. 13). The Lecture held in 1889 is an attempt to reformulate the correspondence theory of truth in such a way as to account for these cases. The basic idea of the text is to replace the correspondence between thought and thing with the idea of the *appropriate, suitable* relation of the judgment to its object. For example, if we are dealing with real objects (things), then truth will be the judgment

looking at Brentano's criticism of the Aristotelian theory of truth today has two significant drawbacks: (1) it entirely omits the fact that, in his first work, the doctoral dissertation *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*,⁴ Brentano supported and provided a detailed interpretation of Aristotle's conception of truth from which he would critically take

which is positively related to them, therefore that which will accept their existence, e.g. "There is a green tree". Contrastly, when we deal with objects of thought, truth will be the judgment that is negatively related to them. Therefore, it will reject their existence, e.g. "There is no dragon". In both cases, we are dealing with judgments that are *suitably* or *appropriately* related to their objects (*ibid.*, pp. 13-17). The following, however, must be added to what has been said above: for Brentano, judgment constitutes a fundamental class of psychic phenomena (the other two are presentations and emotional phenomena) (F. BRENTANO, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. O. KRAUS and L.L. MCALISTER (Eds.). Translated by A.C. RANCURELLO, D.B. TERRELL and L.L. MCALISTER, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 150-155); for him, the existential judgment is the basic form of judgment and any categorical judgment can be reduced to an existential one ("A is B" to "AB is"), (*ibid.*, pp. 163-171); the judgment is fundamentally characterized by a polar intentional relation to its object which lies in the fact that the judgment accepts or rejects its existence (*ibid.*, pp. 161-163); the Lecture on truth from 1889 fully expresses this theory of judgment and is based on the idea that the objects that do not exist can still be presented. After 1904, Brentano gave up this position and considered that only individual things exist and can be thought (ID., *The True*, p. 47). This change resulted in his abandonment of the 1889 position and the transition to a conception of truth as evidence that emphasizes an intrinsic character of the psychical act, its evidence, and not the mode in which the act relates to the object. According to this view, when there are two opposed judgments in relation to a certain object, only one of these judgments will be true, namely that similar to the judgment of the person who would judge with evidence about the object (*ibid.*, p. 82). Although these latter positions are not relevant to the topic of this paper, they show how much Brentano later departed from the position presented in his dissertation. On the problem of truth in Brentano, see: J. SRZEDNICKI, *Franz Brentano's Analysis of Truth*, Den Hague, Nijhoff, 1965, esp. pp. 18-29, pp. 67-110; R. KAMITZ, 'Franz Brentano. Wahrheit und Evidenz', in: J. SPECK (Hrsg.), *Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen. Philosophie der Neuzeit III*, Göttingen, Ruprecht, 1983, pp. 160-197; S. KRANTZ, 'Brentano's Revision of the Correspondence Theory', *Brentano Studien* 3/1990/1991, pp. 79-89; M. VAN DER SCHAAR, 'Brentano on Logic, Truth and Evidence', *Brentano Studien* 10/2002/2003, pp. 119-150; Ch. PARSONS, 'Brentano on Judgment and Truth', in: D. JACQUETTE (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2004, pp. 168-196; J. SEIFERT, 'Eine kritische Untersuchung der Brentanoschen Evidenztheorie der Wahrheit', *Brentano Studien* 12/2006/2009, pp. 307-356; F. BOCCACCINI, 'La vérité efficace. L'origine du concept de vrai chez Brentano entre Evidenzphilosophie et pragmatisme', in: I. TĂNĂSESCU (Ed.), *Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology. Upon the Sesquicentennial of Franz Brentano's Dissertation*, Bucharest, Zeta Books, 2012, pp. 419-452.

⁴ F. BRENTANO, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, Freiburg im Breisgau, Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, 1862 / *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* (henceforth SSB). Edited and translated by R. GEORGE. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975 (all parenthetical page references are to this translation); the terminology I use in the analysis of Brentano's conception about truth in Aristotle's works is the same as R. George's translation; therefore, instead of the term 'correspondence' I shall use 'agreement' or, more rarely, 'harmony'. All references to Aristotle are to ARISTOTLE, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. The Revised Oxford Translation (Bollingen Series 71, 2). Ed. by J. BARNES. Princeton, Princeton UP, 2 vol., 1995.

distance himself later; (2) when analysing the manner in which Brentano interpreted this conception in his first work, scholars often attribute positions to him that he did not, in fact, support. In particular, Brentano is accused of neglecting, herein, the role played by the reality of 'truth-makers' (*die Realität der Wahrmacher*) in the Aristotelian conception of truth.⁵ In order to see what Brentano takes these truth-makers to be, one should consider the basic idea of Brentano's dissertation, namely, that for him there are seven modes in which the accidental categories inhere in the first substance and that each of these modes is a different categorial relation between substance and its accidents (see §2 below). All of these categorial relations have extramental being (*SSB*, p. 26; p. 56). If we utter sentences about them, these sentences are true or false depending on whether or not these accidents are inherent in the first substance. For instance, the sentence "Socrates is white" is true if the property of being white now inheres in Socrates or, formulated in the language of the truth-maker account, *by virtue of* Socrates' being white or of Socrates' whiteness.⁶

These categorial relations between a substance and its accidents are what the expression "the reality of truth-makers" designates in the formulation regarding the neglect of this reality in the Brentanian analysis of the Aristotelian correspondence theory of truth. As a result, I shall further understand by the term 'truth-maker' the categorial relations between substance and its accidents, considered as relations by virtue of which the judgments concerning them are true or false. This position allows me to specify the perspective from which the term 'truth-maker' is approached in this essay: this study is not in any way intended to provide a contribution to the contemporary research devoted to this problem.⁷ Instead, it will provide an interpretation of categorial relations as being what the term 'truth-makers' designates in the statement

⁵ A. CHRUDZIMSKI, *Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos*, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2004, p. 60; p. 62; p. 64.

⁶ ARIST., *Cat.* 1a27-29; on the problem of truth-makers, see K. MULLIGAN, P. SIMONS and B. SMITH, 'Truth-Makers', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 44/1984, pp. 287-321, esp. pp. 287-288; p. 290; pp. 293-294.

⁷ See in this regard Fr. MACBRIDE, 'Truthmakers', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2013 Edition), Ed. E.N. ZALTA, <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/truthmakers/>>.

concerning the neglect of their role in Brentano's reading and aims to provide arguments on behalf of the opposite thesis.⁸ Therefore what follows is only an exegetical contribution, the goals of which are carefully limited to the way in which Brentano understood Aristotle's correspondence theory of truth in his first work. Also, I am specifying that in order to formulate the ideas that follow I accepted from the beginning the assumption on which the position I call into question relies, namely, that the Aristotelian correspondence theory of truth analysed by Brentano can be discussed in the specific terms of the truth-maker account.

In accord with this, I shall present further arguments in favour of the thesis that, in his dissertation, Brentano did not neglect but, on the contrary, placed a particular emphasis on the role of categorial relations as truth-makers in Aristotle. To substantiate this thesis, I shall use two types of arguments:

1. 'Shallow arguments' by which I mean those explicit arguments that can be clearly noticed from an attentive reading of Brentano's dissertation. These textual evidences can be further identified and arranged into two categories:

- 1.1. Those referring to the definition of truth as "agreement [Uebereinstimmung] between cognition and thing" (SSB, p. 17);
- 1.2. Those which expressly emphasize the pre-eminence of the reality in relationship with "the understanding as it forms representations" within knowledge (SSB, p. 17; p. 19).

2. 'Deep arguments', which are thus named because they are difficult to notice even from within an attentive reading of Brentano's dissertation. These latter arguments are not explicitly stated by Brentano but I will try to make them explicit by shedding some light on the role of the thesis about pre-eminence of real truth-makers in relation to judgement within the Brentanian deduction of the Aristotelian categories.

⁸ See A. CHRUDZIMSKI, *Die Ontologie*, p. 60; p. 62.

1. THE IMPORTANCE OF CATEGORIAL RELATIONS AS TRUTH-MAKERS IN BRENTANO'S ANALYSIS OF TRUTH

1.1. *Textual evidence for truth as the "agreement between cognition and thing"*

1.1.1. The Aristotelian background

As is well known, in Aristotle's work, two concepts of truth can be distinguished. They can be differentiated by their object: truth as an agreement between thought and a composite thing, and truth as grasping a 'non-composite' (*tà asýntheta*).⁹ Though the latter problem is not directly relevant to the topic of this study, it is worth noting from the outset that Brentano interprets non-composites either as concepts which "represent [...] the nature of things" (*tò tí esti*) or theologically as "God, pure forms, absolutely simple acts" (*tà mè sýn্থetai ousíai*) (*SSB*, p. 15; pp. 17-18; pp. 156-157). From his viewpoint, however, this is a secondary sense of the term 'truth', to which he does not return in his analysis. Instead, he focuses on establishing the first, fundamental sense of the truth (*SSB*, p. 20).

According to the correspondence theory, truth is "the harmony" between thought and composite things (*SSB*, p. 19). For these things, "being is being combined and one, and not being is being not combined but more than one".¹⁰ From this point of view, judgments in which the concepts are combined as things are in reality, are declared to be true by Aristotle, whereas those in which there is no real correspondence in the conceptual connection are false. This position is closely connected to Aristotle's general idea that judgment is a combination of concepts whose truth is established on the basis of its relationship to reality.¹¹ As I stated above, the statement "Socrates is white" *is true* because the first substance called Socrates, in fact, has the property of being white or *by virtue of Socrates' being white*.¹²

⁹ ARIST., *Met.* IX.10, 1051b17-1052a3.

¹⁰ ARIST., *Met.* IX. 10, 1051b11-13; in his dissertation, Brentano refers explicitly to this excerpt (*SSB*, p. 18).

¹¹ ARIST., *De Int.* 17a1-4.

¹² See, *supra* p. 249; both in the dissertation and in the later texts, the idea of truth-maker in the Husserlian sense of *Sachverhalt* (objectual correlate of the intentional act of judgment and

In *Met.* IX. 10, expressly quoted by Brentano (*SSB*, p. 18), Aristotle enumerates three possibilities regarding the connection between the character of the things being united or separated, and the truth or falsity of the statements referring to them: things either (a) always exist together and are never separated (for instance, the isosceles triangle always has two sides equal in length); or things (b) always exist separated, but never together (for instance, the diagonal is never commensurable with the side of the square); or things (c) exist sometimes together, and are other times separated. Consequently, judgments that will present the things named at (a) and (b) as they really are will always be true while judgments that refer to things that can be otherwise than they are at present will sometimes be true and sometimes false; for example, the sentence “I sit” becomes false when I stand up.¹³

1.1.2. Brentano's reception

The starting point in Brentano's analysis is that the term ‘truth’ (as well as the terms ‘being’ or ‘healthy’) is a homonym by analogy (*homónymon kat' analogían*) (*SSB*, pp. 61-62; pp. 64-66; p. 98).¹⁴ Such homonyms are characterized by the fact that they have several meanings but do not lack a connection between them because all of them stay in a

transcendent to it) remains foreign to Brentano (E. HUSSERL, *Logical Investigations*. Vol. 2. Trans. by J.N. FINDLAY, ed. by D. MORAND, London, Routledge, 2001, pp. 139-140). Brentano criticized this position in the version supported by Meinong (F. BRENTANO, *Psychology*, pp. 227-228; p. 287). The relations between Brentano, on one hand, and A. Marty and Husserl, on the other, are described by M. VAN DER SCHAAR, ‘Brentano on Logic’, pp. 129-134; for an overview of the term *Sachverhalt*, that makes the contribution of Brentano's students clear (Stumpf, Marty, Meinong, Husserl), see B. SMITH, ‘Sachverhalt’, in: J. RITTER und K. GRÜNDER (Hrsg.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*. Bd. 8: R-Sc, Basel, Schwabe & Co, 1992, pp. 1102-1113; for a criticism of Brentano's late conception of truth on the basis of the phenomenological *Sachverhalt* as truth-maker see J. SEIFERT, ‘Eine kritische Untersuchung’, pp. 307-356.

¹³ ARIST., *Met.* IX. 10, 1051b10-16.

¹⁴ ‘Being’ like ‘healthy’ is not considered by Aristotle an *homónymon kat' analogían*, as Brentano wrongly assumes, but as *pròs hèn legómenon* (name which is said “with respect to one and the same nature” (*SSB*, p. 66); see ARIST., *Met.* IV. 2, 1003a33-1003b12; P. AUBENQUE, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote*, Paris, PUF, 1983⁵, pp. 198-296); Brentano, on the contrary, considered *homónymon kat' analogían* as a synonym for *pròs hèn legómenon* (*SSB*, p. 66) which is a sign of the influence of the medieval terminology on him (see M. ANTONELLI, *Seiendes, Bewußtsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von Franz Brentano*, Freiburg/München, Karl Alber, 2001, pp. 85-94; and K. HEDWIG, “... eine gewisse kongeniale Denkweise”. Brentanos Rückgriffe auf Thomas von Aquin in seiner Dissertation’, in: I. TĂNĂSESCU (Ed.), *Franz Brentano's Metaphysics*, pp. 108-113.

relation to the first and proper fundamental sense of the word (*SSB*, p. 17; p. 20; pp. 64-66).

Brentano emphasizes the homonymy of the term 'truth' by referring, on the one hand, to a series of passages in which Aristotle says "that truth and falsity can be found only in [...] judgments" (*SSB*, p. 15).¹⁵ On the other hand, however, he contrasts some of these texts with passages in which Aristotle states the contrary, namely, that truth is also spoken about things, sensory faculties, imagination, outer senses, concepts and "the understanding as it forms representations" (*SSB*, pp. 16-17).¹⁶ The property of a homonym term by analogy as having a first and proper sense in relation to which its other derived senses are constituted has, nonetheless, for Brentano precisely the role of solving the discordance between the two Aristotelian series. In order to establish this primary sense, Brentano starts from *Met.* VI. 4, 1027b20-22 and states clearly from the beginning that the Aristotelian truth is "the agreement between cognition and thing" (*SSB*, p. 17). As cognition takes place in judgments, the Aristotelian statement can be translated without any problems as "the agreement between judgment and thing". If we interpret this thesis using the terminology of K. Mulligan, P. Simons and B. Smith in their paper 'Truth-Makers',¹⁷ then on the one hand, we have the judgment as *truth-bearer* and, on the other hand, the real thing as *truth-maker*. Brentano often repeats and emphasizes the idea of truth as agreement between the two. Thus, it is beyond a doubt that the idea of Brentano having neglected the role of the real truth-makers in his dissertation (i.e., of the categorial relations, in the Aristotelian correspondence theory of truth) has no textual support.¹⁸

¹⁵ ARIST., *De an.* III. 8, 432a10-11; *Met.* IV. 8, 1012b7.

¹⁶ ARIST., *Met.* V. 29, 1024b18-26; *De an.* III. 3, 428b17-18, 428a10-11, 430b27-31.

¹⁷ K. MULLIGAN, P. SIMONS and B. SMITH, 'Truth-Makers', pp. 287-321.

¹⁸ On this position, see A. CHRUDZIMSKI, *Die Ontologie*, p. 60, p. 62; cf., against it, *SSB*: "From this tenet concerning the agreement between true thought and the thing which is thought, Aristotle draws the further conclusion that where there is no combination in things they cannot be cognized by the understanding through combination, i.e., through the connection of a predicate with a subject" (p. 18); "The harmony or disharmony between our thought and the thing has no influence whatever upon the existence of the latter; [...] and our understanding achieves its aim only if it arrives, through science, at this conformity with things, at truth" (p. 19). "If truth is the conformity of the understanding [*Erkenntnisvermoegen*] with the object which is thought, [...]" (p. 19) and the

Stressing this idea is important for understanding the development of his first sense of the term 'truth'. Although Brentano admits that the outer sense and the understanding which represents the concept agree with their own objects, he argues that they do not *grasp* their *agreement* with the objects. The only one able to do this is the understanding that judges: "only when it judges a thing to be as it is cognized does it recognize the truth" (*SSB*, p. 20). That is why the true and the false are formulated in a first and proper sense about judgment and why judgment is thus the basic truth-bearer of the term in relation from which all its other uses are derived. In *De Int.* 17a1-7, Aristotle remarks that, with respect to all forms of utterances (such as requests, wishes, orders, prayers, etc.), judgment is the only one that has truth or falsity attributed to it. This is a convincing argument in favour of Brentano's thesis and he explicitly interprets this point of Aristotle's from the perspective of the multiple and analogous senses of the 'truth':

But if it is established that truth in the first and the proper sense can occur only in a judgment of the understanding, it is not denied that in a secondary and analogous manner the name 'truth' can also be applied to the faculties of our sensory nature, to the faculty of concept-formation, as well as to things themselves (*SSB*, p. 20).

1.2. *Textual evidences for the pre-eminence of categorial relations as truth-makers in relation to truth-bearers*

From what has been said above, it follows that, for Brentano, the Aristotelian term 'truth' fundamentally designates the relation of agreement between the judgment of the understanding (the truth-bearer) and the real thing, its truth-maker. Although these two are related, that which establishes the knowledge relation between them is not the thing but the judgment: things are independent from thought and the fact that they are, or are not, known is accidental in relation to their existence (*SSB*, p. 19).

final remark of the first section: "The basic concept of truth is always the agreement of the cognizing mind with the cognized object" (p. 22); on this topic see, also, D.F. KRELL, 'On the Manifold Meaning of *Aletheia*. Brentano, Aristotle, Heidegger', *Research in Phenomenology* 5/1975, pp. 82-85.

In his analysis, Brentano stresses both the existential independence of the thing from knowledge and the epistemological dependence of knowledge on the thing, quoting the following excerpt from *Met.* IX. 10, 1051b6-8: "You are not white because we believe truthfully that you are white. Rather because you are white, we, who say it, speak the truth" (Brentano's translation, *SSB*, p. 19). According to this, it is not the judgment that one utters that makes the things be as it describes them but, on the contrary, it is the thing itself as it is that is expressed in the true judgment. This passage shows clearly that the truth of the judgment is based on the reality of things, their truth-makers, and represents an extremely eloquent proof against the thesis that Brentano neglected the role of truth-makers in his discussion of the Aristotelian conception of truth. As in the above-mentioned passages, this one shows that he based his entire analysis of the several senses of the term 'truth' precisely on the claim that, for Aristotle, truth is the correspondence between thought and reality that occurs when the connection between concepts made in judgment reflects what exists in reality.

All of the above remarks refer entirely to the first section, 'Of the True and the False', of the chapter dedicated to 'Being in the Sense of Being True' in Brentano's dissertation. In the second section of this chapter, Brentano connects the various senses of truth and falsity to the general problem of the dissertation — the several senses of being in Aristotle — and asks which of the above-mentioned meanings of the term 'truth' is relevant for being in the sense of being true. The answer to this question is in total agreement with what we said before: 'is' ('being') in the sense of 'is true' ('being true') is predicated fundamentally of a given judgment in order to show its agreement or disagreement with reality, for instance, the judgment 'Socrates is white' *is true* (*SSB*, pp. 22-23).¹⁹ Brentano supports this idea both in the first and in the second section of the chapter based on *Met.* VI. 4, 1027b18-23 (*SSB*, p. 17, p. 22-23). The attention he pays in the analysis of this text, and the frequent statements about judgment as first and fundamental

¹⁹ On this problem, see my paper 'Franz Brentano's Dissertation and the Problem of Intentionality', in: I. TĂNĂSESCU (Ed.), *Franz Brentano's Metaphysics*, pp. 157-158.

truth-bearer, have determined interpreters to rightly state that Brentano operates with a logical concept of truth according to which truth and falsity are formulated in the proper sense only about judgment.²⁰

Unlike this view, the ontological concept of truth states that this term is declared first of all about things in order to show that they are combined or separated.²¹ From this perspective, the truth of judgments is derived from the truth of things as they represent the logical and linguistic expression of the categorial relations, their truth-makers. This latter concept was especially emphasized by Heidegger's interpretation of truth in Aristotle, taking its point of departure from the following statement in *Met.* IX. 10, 1051a34-1051b1: "The terms 'being' and 'non-being' are employed firstly with reference to the categories [...] while being and non-being *in the strictest sense* are truth and falsity" (my italics).²² The fact that, for Brentano, the judgment is the fundamental truth-bearer and that, in his analysis, he does not refer to this passage shows clearly that, in the interpretation of truth in Aristotle, Heidegger and Brentano hold different positions.²³

2. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN COGNITION AND THING IN THE BRENTANIAN DEDUCTION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN TABLE OF CATEGORIES

Brentano's dissertation was noted for its analysis of being according to the figures of the categories. This approach became prominent in 19th-Century German Aristotelianism as it countered the Kantian

²⁰ P. AUBENQUE, *Le problème*, p. 166; p. 168.

²¹ From this perspective "[...] being is being combined and one, and not being is being not combined but more than one" (ARIST., *Met.* IX. 10, 1051b11-13). The examples offered by Aristotle in his text are 'white wood' for 'being combined' and 'the incommensurability of the diagonal' for 'being not combined' (*Met.* IX. 10, 1051b20-21).

²² See M. HEIDEGGER, *The Essence of Human Freedom. An Introduction to Philosophy*. Trans. by T. SADLER, London/New York, Continuum, 2002, pp. 56-76; Id., *Logic. The Question of Truth*. Trans. by Th. SHEEHAN, Bloomington/Indianapolis, Indiana UP, 2010, pp. 143-164.

²³ The opposition between the logical and the ontological truth is well-known in the literature: see W. JAEGER, *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, Berlin, Weidmann, 1912, pp. 25-28; P. WILPERT, 'Zum Aristotelischen Wahrheitsbegriff', in: F.-P. HAGER (Hrsg.), *Logik und Erkenntnislehre des Aristoteles*, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972, pp. 106-121; P. AUBENQUE, *Le problème*, pp. 165-170; M. ANTONELLI, *Seiendes*, pp. 80-82.

thesis that there is no guiding principle of the Aristotelian categorial table.²⁴ Thus, the dissertation attempted to provide a systematic deduction of the Aristotelian categories (*SSB*, pp. 94-97). I do not intend to consider this issue here, which is convincingly clarified in the specialist literature.²⁵ Rather, I want to highlight an aspect that has not yet received any attention. This aspect consists in the fact that truth “as the agreement [*Uebereinstimmung*] between cognition and thing” is essential to the Brentanian deduction of the categories and it is based on the fact that the modes of predication specific for true judgment faithfully express the categorial relations of the Aristotelian table. In the following, I shall present arguments for this thesis.

Though Aristotle never speaks about a deductive proof of his categories, Brentano, nevertheless, believes that he can demonstrate the existence of just such a proof in his writings. Brentano's idea is that as Aristotle enumerates the categories, he is driven by the thought that there is an order of categories whose principle is the type of relationship between the primary substance, the fundamental category of being, and all *other* categories (*SSB*, pp. 96-97). This relationship is described by Brentano as indicating a “different mode of existence in primary substance” (*SSB*, p. 95) and can be framed in an order that begins with the way in which the categories are *immanent* to substance (i.e., quality and quantity; the first inheres in substance by virtue of its form; the second by virtue of its matter), continuing with the partially immanent categories, the partially transcendent categories (action and affection), those categories that are exterior to substance (where and when), and

²⁴ I. KANT, *CRP*, A81, B107.

²⁵ See F. VOLPI, ‘La doctrine aristotélicienne de l'être chez Brentano et son influence sur Heidegger’, in: D. THOUARD (Éd.), *Aristote au XIXe siècle*, Lille, Septentrion, 2004, pp. 277-293; Id., ‘Brentanos Interpretation der aristotelischen Seinslehre und ihr Einfluß auf Heidegger’, in: A. DENKER, H. GANDER und H. ZABOROWSKI (Hrsg.), *Heidegger und die Anfänge seines Denkens*, Freiburg, Alber, 2004, pp. 226-242; see, also, R. GEORGE and G. KOEHN, ‘Brentano's Relation to Aristotle’, in: D. JACQUETTE (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2004, pp. 21-25, M. ANTONELLI, *Seiendes*, pp. 73-108, I. TĂNĂSESCU ‘Das Sein der Kopula oder was hat Heidegger bei Brentano versäumt’, *Studia Phaenomenologica. Romanian Journal for Phenomenology* 2 (2002) 1-2, pp. 97-125, K. HEDWIG, “... eine gewisse kongeniale Denkweise” and D. JACQUETTE, ‘Brentano on Aristotle's Categories. First Philosophy and the Manifold Senses of Being’, in: I. TĂNĂSESCU (Ed.), *Franz Brentano's Metaphysics*, pp. 95-131, pp. 51-94.

ending with relation, the category most loosely linked to substance (*SSB*, p. 95; pp. 99-114). For instance, the property of being white (category of quality) inheres in a different way in the singular substance John, than the propriety of being 1,80 m tall (category of quantity), or than the propriety of doing or suffering something (action and affection), or of being in the market at one o'clock (where and when), or of being taller than Mary (relation). Each of these seven attributes has a different relation to the singular substance John, and they are irreducible to one another. Brentano describes this difference by saying that it has to do with different kinds of accidentality, of existence in first substance, or of dependence upon it (*SSB*, p. 97, p. 99, p. 108). For the present demonstration, it is important to note that Brentano believes that these seven different modes of existence find their appropriate expression in seven different manners in which the predicate is asserted of first substance (*SSB*, p. 78).²⁶ In other words, he considers the judgments that are specific for accidental predication (John is white, tall, etc.) as an accurate logical-linguistic expression of the seven accidental categorial relationships specific for the Aristotelian table (*SSB*, p. 75). If we put this in the terms of the truth-makers account, then it can be said that we here have seven different kinds of truth-makers that find their adequate expression in seven different kinds of corresponding truth-bearers. In this way, one can note that the idea consistently highlighted by Brentano in his analysis of the Aristotelian conception of truth (i.e. of truth as agreement between judgment and thing) plays a crucial role in his attempt to deduce the Aristotelian categories: the mode of existence of accidents in primary substance finds its faithful expression in different manners in which the accidental predicates are said of the subject. This idea, which Brentano tells us he took from Thomas Aquinas (*SSB*, pp. 120-122), is clearly expressed in the following passage:

From this it follows at once that the number of, and distinctions between, categories is the same as the number and distinctions of ways in which

²⁶ Based on their manner of predication and on categorial content, Brentano reduces the categories *keisthai* (posture) and *échein* (having) to the class *kinesis* (the class of movements), and to *prós ti* (relation) (*SSB*, pp. 50-51; pp. 107-108; pp. 111-112).

something is predicated of first substance. For something is asserted of first substance in the same way in which it exists in it, since predication (in the proper sense) does not assert anything other than that the predicate is somehow in the subject either as the genus is in the species, or the species in the individual, etc., or as the accident in its substance. (*SSB*, p. 75, see also p. 77, p. 97)

All of the aforementioned, then, clearly indicate two ways of interpreting the categorial relation in Brentano's dissertation: as truth-maker within the Aristotelian correspondence theory of truth, and as different mode of existence of accidents in primary substance (*SSB*, p. 94). The judgments expressing these relationships are both authentic truth-bearers and faithful adequate expressions of categorial relations that can be rigorously ordered. These prove that the analysis of the Aristotelian approach in his dissertation belongs to the traditional, Aristotelian-scholastic framework of correspondence between thought and knowledge, on the one hand, and extra-mental being, on the other hand.²⁷

The statement that Brentano neglects the importance of the reality of truth-makers in his dissertation has been formulated with precise reference to his interpretation of Aristotle's correspondence theory of the truth. What has been proven thus far, however, is that if this were true, the implications of this charge would far exceed the framework of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, and suggest that Brentano's first publication does not operate within the general Aristotelian-scholastic tradition of the correspondence between thinking and being. Brentano's doctoral dissertation, on the contrary, provides plenty of evidence in support of this thesis, whose importance is being increasingly highlighted by contemporary historical studies.²⁸

KEYWORDS: Aristotelian correspondence theory of truth, truth-makers, truth-bearer, metaphysics, Brentano on truth.

²⁷ Brentano will later abandon this correspondence. For a repeated criticism of sensible cognition and of outer perception, see F. BRENTANO, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, pp. 6-7; p. 14.

²⁸ See for instance K. Hedwig's paper, "... eine gewisse kongeniale Denkweise", in: I. TĂNĂSESCU (Ed.), *Franz Brentano's Metaphysics*, pp. 95-131.

SUMMARY

The study argues against the thesis that, in his first writing, Franz Brentano neglected the role of truth-makers in Aristotle's theory of truth. It reveals textual evidence that proves the importance of truth-makers in Brentano's analysis of the Aristotelian correspondence theory of truth in his 1862 doctoral dissertation. It also supports the idea that Brentano's deduction of Aristotle's categories in that work is based on the central tenet of Aristotle's theory of truth, i.e., the agreement between judgment and thing.