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Simpozionul Național Constantin Noica, Ediția a XVI-a „Povestiri despre om…” (26-29 septembrie 2024)SIMPOZIONUL NAŢIONAL
SIMPOZIONUL NAŢIONAL
I.F.P.A.R. RESEARCH SEMINARS (June 4th 2026)
victorg, Monday 01 June 2026 - 00:00:00 //
Joi, June 4th 2026, orele 12–14
Conferențiar: acad. MIRCEA DUMITRU (Romanian Academy / University of Bucharest)
Title: ”On the Normativity of Logic and Ethics”
- online-
Conferențiar: acad. MIRCEA DUMITRU (Romanian Academy / University of Bucharest)
Title: ”On the Normativity of Logic and Ethics”
- online-
Linkul pentru accesul online: https://meet.google.com/idm-boup-spy
Abstract:
The talk explores whether logic is a normative discipline—that is, whether it provides rules that ought to guide reasoning—and how this relates to debates about logical exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism, by comparing logical and ethical normativity within the broader landscape of modal concepts.
Drawing on Kit Fine’s anti-reductionist framework, I distinguish three irreducible kinds of necessity: metaphysical necessity – grounded in the nature of reality; natural necessity – grounded in laws of nature; normative necessity – grounded in norms, obligations, or what ought to be.
I identify myself as an exceptionalist: I maintain that logic preserves its a priori, normative, and foundational role in human reasoning, even amid anti-excep-tionalist challenges.
The presentation surveys the philosophical debate about the normativity and methodology of logic:
• Logic’s traditional exceptional status rests on its normative authority and
universality.
• Anti-exceptionalists, by contrast, treat logical theory formation as fallible,
abductive, and revisable, aligned with scientific practice.
• The contemporary challenge is to reconcile logic’s normative role with a
non-exceptionalist, abductive methodology—a question that I approach
The talk explores whether logic is a normative discipline—that is, whether it provides rules that ought to guide reasoning—and how this relates to debates about logical exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism, by comparing logical and ethical normativity within the broader landscape of modal concepts.
Drawing on Kit Fine’s anti-reductionist framework, I distinguish three irreducible kinds of necessity: metaphysical necessity – grounded in the nature of reality; natural necessity – grounded in laws of nature; normative necessity – grounded in norms, obligations, or what ought to be.
I identify myself as an exceptionalist: I maintain that logic preserves its a priori, normative, and foundational role in human reasoning, even amid anti-excep-tionalist challenges.
The presentation surveys the philosophical debate about the normativity and methodology of logic:
• Logic’s traditional exceptional status rests on its normative authority and
universality.
• Anti-exceptionalists, by contrast, treat logical theory formation as fallible,
abductive, and revisable, aligned with scientific practice.
• The contemporary challenge is to reconcile logic’s normative role with a
non-exceptionalist, abductive methodology—a question that I approach







