Probleme de logică, vol. XXVIII, 2025


PROBLEME DE LOGICĂunited_kingdom_square_icon_64.png
 
 Numărul curent

Coperta Probleme de Logica_XXVIII_2025.pngPROBLEME DE LOGICĂ, vol. XXVIII
Coordonatori: Acad. Mircea Dumitru,
Marius Dobre, Viorel Vizureanu, Ștefan-Dominic Georgescu
Editura Academiei Române, Bucureşti, 2025
ISSN 3008-2870
ISSN-L 1454- 2366

C U P R I N S

DOES A TARSKIAN THEORY OF TRUTH OFFER A THEORY OF MEANING? A SELLARSIAN-TYPE EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE OF DONALD DAVIDSON’S TRUTH-CONDITIONAL SEMANTICS*
MIRCEA DUMITRU
University of Bucharest / Romanian Academy

Abstract. The paper examines and assesses how Davidson could be fixed through Sellars. I begin by presenting Donald Davidson’s truth-conditional semantics for a natural language, viz. the program according to which the meaning of a language is to be given by a Tarskian truth-theory for that language. Against this background, I build a scenario in which a competent logician can give a truth-theory for sentences of a language that he/she cannot speak/read/understand without thereby giving/knowing the meaning of the sentences that he/she cannot comprehend. The logician knows that the sentences in the unknown (for him/her) language are true but, nevertheless, he/she does not know what they mean. In order to fix this drawback of the Davidsonian truth-conditional based theory of meaning, I present the main elements of Sellars’ subtle views on meaning and truth, pointing at how the latter can circumvent the problems with the extensional
Tarskian truth-conditional approach put forward by Davidson.
Keywords: Donald Davidson’s truth-conditional semantics, meaning, Wilfrid Sellars’ approach to meaning and truth, Tarskian truth-theory.

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ASPECTE PRIVIND LOGICA INTENSIUNILOR 
IONEL NARIȚA
Universitatea de Vest din Timișoara

SOME ISSUES CONCERNING THE LOGIC OF INTENSIONS
Abstract. The Logic of intensions investigates the systems /F, U, H/, where F is the set of intensions, U is the universe of objects, and H is a set of functions, called contexts, h: F → P(U), which follow the principle of Frege and the Law of inverse variation. The intensions are elements of several types of systems, like scales, which include incompatible and complementary intensions. The elements of a scale are expressed using terms organized into parameters. The value of the propositions or inferences containing such terms depends upon the properties of parameters.
Keywords: intension, extension, context, parameter, change.

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LOGICĂ ȘI GEOMETRIE ÎN FORMAREA CONCEPTELOR ȘTIINȚIFICE. DE LA LOTZE LA CASSIRER
IOAN BIRIȘ
Universitatea de Vest din Timișoara

LOGIC AND GEOMETRY IN THE FORMATION OF SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS. FROM LOTZE TO CASSIRER
Abstract. In the present study, the author traces the lineage of ideas between Lotze and Cassirer in the process of affirming the logic of relations following two revolutions in 19th-century geometry: a) the affirmation of projective geometry; b) the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries. These revolutions justify the essential presence of ideal elements in the formation of concepts and reasoning, which encourages Cassirer in supporting logical idealism. Taking into account the limits of syllogistic inferences, Lotze attempts to demonstrate the importance of mathematical and systematic inferences for the new logic. There is a continuity of argumentation from Lotze to Cassirer for the new logic and against the method of abstraction from traditional logic, the present study tracing this continuity especially in the sphere of geometric concepts.
Keywords: Aristotelian logic; modern logic; geometric concepts; function; relation.

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LOGICA DIALECTICO-SPECULATIVĂ ȘI ROSTIREA BIBLICĂ
FLOREA LUCACI
Universitatea „Aurel Vlaicu”, Arad

DIALECTICAL-SPECULATIVE LOGIC AND THE BIBLICAL UTTERANCE
Abstract. Alexandru Surdu’s revival of the need for a dialectical-speculative logic, intended to operate in the field of ontology, especially the probing of transcendence, is a great challenge. As an argument, he invokes the need to take into account the existence of different ontic reference domains for human thought, to which classical logic, mathematical logic and speculative logic would correspond. From a historical perspective, he capitalizes on ideas from the philosophies of Plato, Kant and especially Hegel. Dialectical-speculative logic is the basis of the pentadic philosophical system.
Keywords: dialectical-speculative logic, ontology, transcendence.

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WITTGENSTEIN VS GÖDEL. ÎNTRE METAFIZICĂ, METAMATEMATICĂ ȘI NONSENS
IULIAN GRIGORIU
Universitatea „Dunărea de Jos”, Galaţi

WITTGENSTEIN VS GÖDEL. BETWEEN METAPHYSICS, METAMATHEMATICS, AND NONSENSE
Abstract. The well-known interpretative conflict between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Kurt Gödel is reassessed here through the lenses of metaphysics, metamathematics, and nonsense. Beginning with Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem (1931), the article examines Wittgenstein’s critical remarks in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Appendix III, ca. 1937). Gödel demonstrated, by means of arithmetization and diagonalization, how a formal proposition can assert its own unprovability – a result which, under the standard interpretation, becomes the expression of undecidable truth. The article reconstructs, both logically and philosophically, Wittgenstein’s claim that such a proposition is a construct that formally resembles mathematical propositions, yet lacks any normative function within the game of proof. The paradoxical convergence between the two thinkers regarding the limits of formal systems is brought to light: in Gödel’s case through logical construction, in Wittgenstein’s case through the critique of meaning and the reformulation of semantics. Against the backdrop of the complex relation between truth, proof, and provability, I argue that Gödel’s theorem does not substantiate the possibility of “truth” transcending the formal framework, being rather a satisfaction within the standard model ℕ. At the same time, Wittgenstein’s critical stance does not exclude a Platonic or metaphysical reality. In continuity with the Tractatus line of thought, within the philosophy of logic and mathematics, nonsense retains an elucidatory role, assuming different forms – from the objective (such as “truth”) to the speculative (such as “to prove”), mathematically and metaphysically disguised. To structure and ground Wittgenstein’s position vis-à-vis Gödel, I clarify the complex relation between proof and
interpretation, highlight the dynamics of a (mathematical) proposition’s status relative to them, and distinguish between the rule of a (meta)mathematical game and the regular use of signs within that game. The concluding question –“What can we do with natural numbers?” – reopens the discussion on the structural limits of axiomatizable theories, while also acknowledging that the shift to stronger theories may render the Gödelian proposition provable within another mathematical game (theory, inference rules, notion of proof). This supports Wittgenstein’s conception that the status of a proposition is relative to rules of use, and that no absolute reference system exists in mathematics or in some generic grammatical space from which an ultimate principle of truth might emanate.
Keywords: incompleteness, truth, proof, provability, interpretation, mathematical game.

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ROLUL ȘI STATUTUL PRINCIPIILOR DE INVARIANȚĂ
CONSTANTIN C. BRÎNCUȘ
Institutul de Filosofie și Psihologie „Constantin Rădulescu-Motru”, Academia Română

THE ROLE AND THE STATUS OF INVARIANCE PRINCIPLES
Abstract. The aim of this paper is to sketch a rough explanation of the notion of law of nature on the basis of the method of invariance under a group of transformations elaborated by the German mathematician Felix Klein. The explanation is given in analogy with Alfred Tarski’s proposal to explain the logical notions by this method. The paper provides an analysis of the principles of invariance (symmetry) in physics and discusses some arguments for the idea that these principles are not just theoretical instruments, but they rather have a real existence in the physical world.
Keywords: invariance (symmetry) principles, group of transformations, logical notions, laws of nature.

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DUMMETT’S FREGEAN SOLUTION TO THE PARADOX OF ANALYSIS 
NORA GRIGORE
Institutul de Filosofie și Psihologie “Constantin Rădulescu-Motru”, Academia Română

Abstract. The main topic of the essay is a puzzle over a certain kind of identity statements. There are identity statements that claim to be in the same time true and informative. This is puzzling because in order for the identity to be true, the two sides must be identical and in order to be informative the two sides must be different. These kinds of identity statements are not unusual (see any mathematical equation) but they are difficult to explain. I will focus o a Fregean kind of explanation and I will critically analyze Dummett’s take on a Fregean solution to the paradox of analysis.
Keywords: paradox of analysis, Frege, Dummett, sense, reference, identity statements.

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CONVERGENCES: NAE IONESCU AND ‘ANALYTIC ONTOLOGIES’
EMIL IONESCU
Faculty of Letters, Bucharest University

Abstract. In Nae Ionescu’s academic courses in logic, the history of logic, the logic of science, and metaphysics there are concepts and themes pointing to connexions to a philosophical orientation which Russell referred to as the scientific method in philosophy. In this article, we frame these concepts and themes in a context of ideas that we call, (with an ad-hoc term), analytic ontologies. In analytic ontologies, the underlying ontology of the scientific method in philosophy is the first chronological segment. When Nae Ionescu described the surrounding world he utilized the means of this philosophical orientation and he roughly assumed the same kind of entities. This fact did not help him to be a rationalist philosopher. Nevertheless, it allows us to speak about his case as one of the first openings in Romanian philosophy towards the analytic orientation. The neglect of this opening may be due to the fact that Nae Ionescu’s ideas discussed in this article did not arouse the interest of any of his disciples. 
Keywords: Nae Ionescu, analytic ontologies, event, fact, judgment, belief.

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RECONSTRUCTIA LOGICII CLASICE LA ALEXANDRU SURDU (V). TEORIA RAȚIONAMENTULUI
ȘERBAN N. NICOLAU
Institutul de Filosofie și Psihologie ,,Constantin Radulescu-Motru", Academia Română

ALEXANDRU SURDU ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF CLASSICAL LOGIC (rv). THE THEORY OF REASONING
Abstract. This article continues the presentation of Alexandru Surdu's reconstruction of classical-traditional logic with its third independent logical form: reasoning. Unlike the first two logical forms, the notion and judgment, whose complete Aristotelian developments have not been preserved, the third logical form is fully presented in Aristotle's works: in the Prior Analytics, regarding the syllogism in general, and in the Posterior Analytics, concerning the scientific syllogism.
Keywords: syllogism, premise, conclusion, syllogistic figure, syllogistic mode, reduction, conversion, enthymeme

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CONTRACȚIUNEA LOGICĂ. O NOUĂ IMAGINE A FORMALULUI (II)
CEZAR ROȘU
Institutul de Filosofie și Psihologie „Constantin Rădulescu-Motru”, Academia Română

THE LOGICAL CONTRACTION. A NEW IMAGE OF THE FORMAL (II)
Abstract. All formal logic operates with the universal. In Constantin Noica’s view, this is its weak point, because the universal is postulated and abstract (a simple summation of generals). From this arises its necessity, but this necessity is only apparent. The universal must be defined, so it will need to seek its own necessity. In the new formalism proposed by Noica, the known logical forms become condensations of the logical process, but along a different path of formalization – opposite to classical logic – namely from the complex to the simple, with contraction occurring in the opposite direction along: syllogism → judgment → concept. In the syllogism, the first expression of necessity emerging in the logical process is reflected, namely the causal sequence (as Aristotle said, the syllogism represents knowledge through causes). In the judgment, the second form of necessary relation is reflected: substantial inherence or, in the active thinking of moderns, functional dependence. In the concept, the third form is reflected: community, and with a horizon of reality, the concept becomes a system. The syllogism is now structured with the help of only three profases from the six generated in the logical field: the delimitative (G–D), the integrative (I–G), and the determinative (I–D), which, depending on the syllogistic figures they form, become in turn the major premise, minor premise, or middle term. 
Keywords: universal, syllogism, judgment, concept, general, determinations, individual, delimitative, integrative, determinative, rules of syllogistic figures, axiom of the syllogism.

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ARGUMENTAREA PRIN PUNERE ÎN BALANȚĂ ÎN DISCURSUL JURIDIC. O ANALIZĂ BAZATĂ PE CONCEPȚIA LUI ROBERT ALEXY
DRAGOȘ BÎGU
Academia de Studii Economice, București

BALANCING ARGUMENT IN LEGAL DISCOURSE. AN ANALYSIS BASED ON ROBERT ALEXY’S VIEW
Abstract. I examine the structure of balancing arguments in legal contexts. focusing on Robert Alexy’s approach. In the first section, I distinguish between two types of balancing, general and contextual. In the second, I show that the three balancing parameters in Alexy’s Weight Formula should be supplemented by two additional ones. In the last part, drawing on Barwise’s and Perry’s situational logic, I sketch a formal language for the balancing arguments, whose central idea is that the normatively relevant factors are expressed as statements that are true or false in certain situations.
Keywords: balancing argument, situation logic, conflicts between rights, relevant factors.

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AMELIORARE ȘI EVENIMENT 
GABRIEL ILIESCU
Universitatea „Spiru Haret”, București

AMELIORATION AND EVENT
Abstract. The apparent distancing between concept of amelioration and that of event in Wright’s sens of the word is very strong. However, the two prove to be closely related. The states of some events can be specified by states of facts that express the concept of amelioration. The event of emergence can be specified by states of facts in which the values of a variable draw near the limits of their reference range and enter it. While the conservation of absence stands for a series of values which only draw near this reference range but do not enter it. By the event of emergence we render the straightening. We understand the straightening as hard meaning of amelioration. By the event of conservation of absence we render the improvement of the values of the same variable. By improvement we understand weak meaning of the amelioration.
Keywords: amelioration, emergence, conservation of absence, straightening, improvement, reference range.

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A NOTE ON THE UNSAYABLE: USING SPLIT LANGUAGES FOR EPISTEMIC INCOMPLETE DESCRIPTIONS
MARIAN CĂLBOREAN
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest

Abstract. This note introduces the core intuition and basic construction of split epistemic languages, a novel framework for modeling incomplete descriptions in epistemic logic. Standard Kripke models often overstate what agents can plausibly formulate by presupposing a shared maximal language. The proposed remedy is to assign each agent a sub-language called “split language”, generated from only those concepts which they can grasp. By blocking inexpressible formulas at the syntactic level, this approach distinguishes lack of information (uncertainty) and lack of conception (unawareness), solving some standard puzzles of epistemic logic. This note presents the initial problem statement, the core intuition and basic formal machinery, together with several applications which demonstrate the framework's applicability.
Keywords: epistemic logic, awareness, expressibility, uncertainty, muddy children puzzle.

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LIMITELE LIMBAJULUI ȘI LIMITELE SISTEMELOR FORMALE
EMANUEL ȘTEFAN
Facultatea de Filosofie, Universitatea București

LIMITS OF LANGUAGE AND LIMITS OF FORMAL SYSTEMS
Abstract. This paper offers an analytic comparison between Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, arguing for a structural correspondence between the limit of sense and the limit of provability. I clarify bipolarity (as a condition for sense) and representability (as required for arithmetization), and explain why attempts to “say” a system’s own form are nonsensical within the Tractatus. On Gödel’s side, arithmetization and the diagonal lemma yield a true but unprovable sentence G and show that a system P cannot prove Con(P) using only its own resources (under the usual consistency hypotheses – ω-consistency or, via Rosser, simple consistency). On this basis, I formulate the Tractatus versus Gödel (TvG) Blind Spot Conjecture: no representational system can, from within itself, exhaustively express the conditions of its own intelligibility. The result is not an identity claim but a principled structural analogy, philosophically and metamathematically motivated, showing that any such system leaves, by necessity, a “blind spot” with respect to its enabling conditions.
Keywords: Wittgenstein’s Tractatus; Gödel’s incompleteness theorems; self-reference; bipolarity and representability; TvG (Blind Spot) Conjecture.

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DEZVOLTAREA PERSPECTIVEI LOGICO-METAFIZICE HEGELIENE ÎN ȘCOALA BRITANICĂ DE FILOSOFIE ÎN SECOLELE AL XIX-LEA ȘI AL XX-LEA
ȘTEFAN-DOMINIC GEORGESCU
Institutul de Filosofie și Psihologie „Constantin Rădulescu-Motru”, Academia Română / Academia de Studii Economice, București

THE EVOLUTION OF THE HEGELIAN LOGICAL-METAPHYSICAL PERSPECTIVE WITHIN THE BRITISH SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES
Abstract. This paper surveys the reception, appropriation, and critique of G.W.F. Hegel’s Science of Logic within British philosophy from the late nineteenth century through the twentieth century. It focuses on three broad phases: (1) the British Idealist appropriation of Hegel’s logical method (T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, J.&E. McTaggart); (2) the analytic reaction and methodological repudiation (G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and the early analytic movement); and (3) the mid- and late-twentieth-century reassessments, reconstructions, and selective rehabilitations (R. G. Collingwood, John N. Findlay, and later Anglophone commentators). I argue that British responses to Hegel’s logic are best read not as a single line of endorsement or rejection but as shifting engagements that refract Hegel’s dialectical method against changing philosophical priorities: metaphysical systematicity, ethical and political theory, clarity and analysis, and finally, historical hermeneutics. The paper closes with reflections on what British engagements with Hegel’s logic might teach contemporary philosophers about method, the nature of negation, and concept-formation.
Keywords: Hegel’s logic, dialectic, british Hegelianism, speculative contradiction, negation.

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TEORIA SOFISMELOR ÎN LOGICA INFORMALĂ
MARIUS DOBRE
Institutul de Filosofie și Psihologie „Constantin Rădulescu-Motru”, Academia Română

FALLACY THEORY IN INFORMAL LOGIC
Abstract. In what follows, we will present and analyze the issues related to the theory of logical errors most frequently encountered in works on informal logic. The chapters of the article will include: first, the causes of faulty reasoning; second, the question of the actual existence of fallacies; third, the question of the existence of fallacies as argumentation schemes; after which we will present a list of the most frequently discussed sophistical arguments that can also be recovered as valid arguments in everyday reasoning.
Keywords: fallacy theory, the causes of faulty reasoning, formal and informal errors, argumentation schemes

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