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I.F.P.A.R. RESEARCH SEMINARS (29 January 2026)
victorg, Monday 26 January 2026 - 00:00:00 //
Thursday, 29 January 2026, 12:00–14:00
Speaker: Professor ARNAUD DEWALQUE (Center for Phenomenological Research, Philosophy Department, University of Liège)
Title: „Understanding Appearances in Brentano”
– online –
Meeting invite link: https://meet.google.com/idm-boup-spy
*No registration required.
Speaker: Professor ARNAUD DEWALQUE (Center for Phenomenological Research, Philosophy Department, University of Liège)
Title: „Understanding Appearances in Brentano”
– online –
Meeting invite link: https://meet.google.com/idm-boup-spy
*No registration required.
Abstract:
Franz Brentano famously held that offering an analysis of the mind is essentially a matter of describing mental phenomena or mental appearances. But what does that mean? In this paper, I review three alternative ways of understanding phenomena or appearances, namely (1) phenomena as observable facts (Comte), (2) phenomena as ‘mere appearances’ (Kant), and (3) the idea of a ‘veil of appearances’ between you and the world (Locke). I argue, first, that Brentano’s notion of appearances does not commit him to any of these three views, and second, that for him the word ‘appearance’ (Erscheinung) simply refers to the fact that something appears a certain way (to someone). I call this type of fact a phenomenological fact. So, just as ordinary perceptual reports such as ‘the sky looks blue’ and ‘the coffee is cold’ capture phenomenological facts, psychological reports such as ‘I hear the cat meowing behind the door’ and ‘I hope Mary will come to the party’ capture phenomenological facts, too. More pointedly, they capture ways you appear to yourself as a mentally active subject.
Franz Brentano famously held that offering an analysis of the mind is essentially a matter of describing mental phenomena or mental appearances. But what does that mean? In this paper, I review three alternative ways of understanding phenomena or appearances, namely (1) phenomena as observable facts (Comte), (2) phenomena as ‘mere appearances’ (Kant), and (3) the idea of a ‘veil of appearances’ between you and the world (Locke). I argue, first, that Brentano’s notion of appearances does not commit him to any of these three views, and second, that for him the word ‘appearance’ (Erscheinung) simply refers to the fact that something appears a certain way (to someone). I call this type of fact a phenomenological fact. So, just as ordinary perceptual reports such as ‘the sky looks blue’ and ‘the coffee is cold’ capture phenomenological facts, psychological reports such as ‘I hear the cat meowing behind the door’ and ‘I hope Mary will come to the party’ capture phenomenological facts, too. More pointedly, they capture ways you appear to yourself as a mentally active subject.
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cu toate drepturile rezervate. Utilizarea materialelor apărute în conținutul sitului este permisă numai în scop educativ sau orientativ pentru cercetare academică,
cu condiția respectării drepturilor de autor si a drepturilor de proprietate intelectuala stabilite prin legislația în vigoare.
Site acţionat cu cms e107, realizat sub termenii Licenţei GNU GPL.