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I.F.P.A.R. RESEARCH SEMINARS (19 February 2026)
victorg, Monday 16 February 2026 - 00:00:00 //
Thursday, 19 February 2026, 12:30–14:30 (EET)
Speaker: Professor KARIN DE BOER (KU Leuven)
Title: „The Critique of Pure Reason as a System of Ends”
– online –
Meeting invite link: https://meet.google.com/idm-boup-spy
*No registration required.
Speaker: Professor KARIN DE BOER (KU Leuven)
Title: „The Critique of Pure Reason as a System of Ends”
– online –
Meeting invite link: https://meet.google.com/idm-boup-spy
*No registration required.
Abstract:
Kant conceived of the Critique of Pure Reason as a science intended to assess the sources and limits of the a priori cognitions pursued by pure reason (A11/B25, cf. Axv). He claims that the Critique could carry out this assessment in a comprehensive manner because its object – pure reason – is itself “a perfect unity” (Axiii). The B-Preface specifies this point by comparing pure reason to an organism of which all parts exist for the sake of a single end (Bxxiii). Taking a cue from this analogy, I argue that the first Critique is informed by a thoroughgoing yet largely implicit methodological organicism. I further take Kant to account for this organicism in the part of the Critique of the Power of Judgment in which he elaborates his conception of teleological reasoning and, more specifically, his organicist conception of systematicity. The paper brings to bear this element of the third Critique on the first Critique by focusing on Kant’s analysis of the human mind in the A-Deduction and his conception of scientific systematicity in the Appendix and Architectonic.
Kant conceived of the Critique of Pure Reason as a science intended to assess the sources and limits of the a priori cognitions pursued by pure reason (A11/B25, cf. Axv). He claims that the Critique could carry out this assessment in a comprehensive manner because its object – pure reason – is itself “a perfect unity” (Axiii). The B-Preface specifies this point by comparing pure reason to an organism of which all parts exist for the sake of a single end (Bxxiii). Taking a cue from this analogy, I argue that the first Critique is informed by a thoroughgoing yet largely implicit methodological organicism. I further take Kant to account for this organicism in the part of the Critique of the Power of Judgment in which he elaborates his conception of teleological reasoning and, more specifically, his organicist conception of systematicity. The paper brings to bear this element of the third Critique on the first Critique by focusing on Kant’s analysis of the human mind in the A-Deduction and his conception of scientific systematicity in the Appendix and Architectonic.







